





   
 
 
M INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH • SURVEY RESEARCH CENTER MICHIGAN RETIREMENT RESEARCH CENTER UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN Working PaperWP 2017-369
Long-Term Effects of Leaving Military Service 
in a Weak Economy
Italo A. Gutierrez and Jennie W. Wenger




















   
  
    
    
 
  Regents of the University of Michigan
   
     
   
  






Michigan Retirement Research Center
University of Michigan
P.O. Box 1248




The research reported herein was performed pursuant to a grant from the U.S. Social Security
Administration (SSA) funded as part of the Retirement Research Consortium through the University of
Michigan Retirement Research Center Award RRC08098401-09. The opinions and conclusions expressed 
are solely those of the author(s) and do not represent the opinions or policy of SSA or any agency of the 
federal government. Neither the United States government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the
accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of the contents of this report. Reference herein to any specific 
commercial product, process or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not
necessarily constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States
government or any agency thereof.
Michael J. Behm, Grand Blanc; Mark J. Bernstein, Ann Arbor; Shauna Ryder Diggs, Grosse Pointe; Denise Ilitch,
Bingham Farms; Andrea Fischer Newman, Ann Arbor; Andrew C. Richner, Grosse Pointe Park; Ron Weiser, Ann







   
  
  






















Long-Term Effects of Leaving Military Service in a Weak Economy
Abstract
Previous research finds negative effects in the short and medium term for those who initially
entered the labor force during weak labor markets. Discerning the effects of initial market
conditions is difficult as young workers may attempt to time their entry by, for example,
spending additional time in school during weak markets. In this paper, we take advantage of a 
novel form of exogenous variation that affected a large group of older workers to study longer-
term effects of entering labor markets during bad economic times. Using the Health and
Retirement Study, we focus on veterans from the draft era and examine the effects of leaving
military service during periods of high unemployment on earnings, wealth, and retirement. These
men had little choice about the timing of entry into the labor force; they generally were drafted
or volunteered based on world events, and they left the military at the end of fixed contracts after
short terms of service. Our results indicate that draft-era veterans who entered the labor force
during a weaker economy had lower levels of earnings, and the effects lasted for more than a 
decade. We also find that while veterans who enter weak labor markets eventually catch up with
other veterans in terms of earnings, the accumulated negative effects on wealth and financial
preparedness for retirement are large; we find some evidence that veterans compensate by
extending their working lives.
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1. Introduction and Background 
To some extent, when each person enters the job market is determined by luck: timing of
their birth, schooling, and training. Some people search for a first job during a strong labor
market with plentiful jobs and substantial wage growth; others face very different circumstances, 
perhaps entering during a downturn or a recession in which jobs are scarcer and wages are lower.
More than three million job-seekers enter the labor force each year; thus, millions of young 
adults entered the labor force during the most recent downturn (the Great Recession).1 
Previous literature has studied the negative effects of entering the labor market in a 
recession on earnings and income for several groups: high school graduates (Hershbein, 2012); 
college graduates (Kahn, 2010; Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz, 2012); Ph.D. and MBA
graduates (Oyer, 2006, 2008); and prime-age male workers (Beaudry and DiNardo, 1991;
Brunner and Kuhn, 2009; Genda, Kondo, and Ohta, 2010). Across these groups, research
consistently shows that the negative effects of entering the labor market during a recession are 
sizeable and last for a number of years, at least through the first one to two decades of the
workers’ careers. Existing results imply large and substantial accumulated effects. Moreover, 
these effects can be found in measures other than wages. Entering a weak labor market
influences eventual post-secondary educational attainment and also appears to result in 
somewhat lower occupational status (Kahn, 2010). However, despite the extensive research on 
this subject, very little is known about the longer-term effects of entering the labor market during
a recession and the extent to which this timing influences wealth, savings, or retirement. Given
the sequential nature of wages, such early differences could be reflected throughout the entire







      
   
 





   
  
    
    
  
   
     
    
                                     
    
     
  
      
although the likely direction of the effects is not clear. For example, those who enter the labor
market during a recessionary period could work longer, or could retire earlier as the opportunity
cost of doing so might be lower. 
Obtaining a better understanding of the longer-term effects of recessions on workers’ 
careers would be especially valuable in the current environment, in which many young workers
entered the labor force during the recent, severe recession. In other words, understanding the
longer-term impacts of initial conditions on workers and their retirement decisions would
provide information that could be very useful in predicting the retirement behavior and financial
preparedness of tomorrow’s retirees.
One potential criticism of existing work is that entry into the labor force can, in some
cases, be timed based on economic conditions. For example, Kahn (2010) finds that those who 
completed college during weaker labor markets had higher levels of educational attainment (but
lower earnings): This suggests that workers may pursue additional education during weak 
economies. To help circumvent this issue, we take advantage of a novel form of exogenous
variation; we examine the long-term earnings of older veterans from the draft era. These men
had little choice about the timing of entry into the labor force; they generally were drafted or
volunteered based on world events, and they left the military at the end of fixed contracts after
short terms of service. 
To focus on young workers who enter the labor force after a short time in the military, we
include only veterans who served no more than five years.2 These veterans emerge from the 
military in a situation that is somewhat similar to college graduates — with recently acquired
2 Most veterans, in the past and today, serve less than five years. Veterans who serve at least 20 years are eligible 
for military retirement; this benefit, which begins immediately upon exiting the military, is likely to impact a variety
of labor market choices. To avoid the influence of retirement and to capture those least likely to time their exit from





   
 
     
   
     
 




     
   
    
    
   
   
  
  
   
   
                                     
   
  
human capital but with limited (civilian) labor market experience. Their timing of entry into the
civilian labor force was determined primarily by the end of their contracts, providing a source of
arguably exogenous variation.
We also note that there is a well-developed literature examining the question of how
military service influences educational attainment and eventual civilian earnings (see for 
example, Angrist, 1990; Angrist and Chen, 2011; Angrist and Krueger, 1994; Bound and Turner, 
2002; Loughran et al., 2011). While the literature comparing veterans and non-veterans has
important policy implications, it focuses on a different question than the one we examine here. 
Our focus is on the long-term impact of labor market conditions at re-entry into the civilian labor
force. Therefore, rather than comparing veterans to nonveterans, we compare veterans who 
entered strong civilian labor markets with similar veterans who entered weaker civilian markets. 
Therefore, this research is in the spirit of Kahn (2010) and similar papers.
We use the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) in our study.3 This dataset provides the
opportunity to examine the effects of entering the civilian labor market during a recession on 
veterans’ earnings through their entire careers, on their retirement decisions, and on their
financial preparedness for retirement (measured by wealth, including Social Security and pension 
wealth). Our findings provide relevant information on how current economic conditions may
affect today’s young workers’ eventual preparation for and timing of retirement, and thus should 
be of interest to policymakers at the SSA. Our findings should also be of interest to policymakers 
working to smooth current veterans’ transitions into the civilian labor force.
Our paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we describe the draft era in America, 
including the number of veterans that served in each era and common periods of service; in
3 The HRS (Health and Retirement Study) is sponsored by the National Institute on Aging (grant number NIA
U01AG009740) and is conducted by the University of Michigan.
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Section 3, we describe our data and sample criteria, and present descriptive statistics; in Section 
4 we address potential selection issues that can affect the validity of our estimates; in Section 5
we estimate the effects of leaving active service in periods of high unemployment on education 
attainment and on marital status; in Section 6, we estimate the effects on employment and
earnings using administrative Social Security data; in Section 7, we estimate the effects on
prospective retirement wealth; in Section 8, we estimate the effects on working in old age and on 
claiming Social Security benefits, based on the information reported in the HRS; finally, Section 
9 presents the conclusions of our study.
2. The draft in America, 1915-1973
After relying on military drafts throughout its history, the United States shifted slowly
away from the draft in the 1970s. For all practical purposes, the draft ended in 1973 and since
that period, the U.S. has recruited military personnel and maintained an all-volunteer force 
(AVF).4 The current AVF model involves selection into the military — some who apply to enlist
are deemed ineligible due to low test scores, poor health, or other issues; at the same time, 
military service is relatively rare among the most advantaged members of society. Additionally, 
military service today is much more common among those whose parents served in the military
(Schafer, 2017)
Prior to the advent of the AVF, a draft was enacted surrounding each of the major
conflicts during the period 1915-1975 (in fact, the draft was also used in earlier periods; see 
Sohoni and Vafa (2010), as well as Barry (2013) for more information). At first glance, the draft 
4 Although draft numbers were assigned through 1975 covering men born through 1956, no men were drafted into 
service after 1973. However, the Selective Service has continually required that all men register upon turning 18;
this pool exists should a draft become necessary. See Rostker (2006) for a discussion of the transition and a
complete history of the All-Volunteer Force in the United States.
4
 
   
  
   
     
   
      
    
 
  
    
    
    
   
       
   
 
  
    
  
 
      
 
appears to avoid many selection issues, creating a situation in which enlistees could be viewed as
a random sample of the population of young males. However, it is worth noting than even in 
different eras, some young men served in the military voluntarily. Thus, there might still be a
selection into the military that varies across veterans of different eras. We explicitly address this
in our analysis as discussed later. In the draft era, it is also worth noting that some young men are 
deemed ineligible to serve. This means that some of our results may lack external validity for the
average male population. Below, we briefly describe the draft during each major conflict 
relevant to our data.
In World War II, about 16 million men served in the military: The overall population of
the U.S. at the time was about 133 million. The WWII military experienced extremely rapid
growth at the advent of the war, growing twenty-fold in three years. During this period, the
majority of young men served in the military. At the end of the war, one might expect that all 
service members would have exited at around the same time (their commitment was for the
length of the war plus six months). In fact, there is some variation in timing of exit. While there 
was significant public pressure to release service members quickly, it was not possible to process
all service members simultaneously: Demobilization began in May 1945 and continued through 
1946. During this period, the size of the military reduced by about 87 percent. Today, only about
10 percent of WW II veterans are living; thus, this group will likely not make up most of our
sample, but because of the sheer size of the WW II military, they still form a relatively large sub-
sample.
During the Korea conflict, some six million served; at least 1.5 million were drafted and










    
 
       
        
    
   
    
  
  
       
   
      
       
                                     
        
   
   
allowing substantial variation of economic conditions at exit. About 2.3 million Korea-era 
veterans are alive today.
The Vietnam conflict was lengthy in nature. During that era, some 8.7 million service
members served; about 3.4 million were deployed to Southeast Asia. Draftees generally served
in the Army for 24 months; volunteers chose their branch and generally served for three years.
Large numbers of men were drafted in 1970, 1971, and 1972. Thus, there is considerable
variation in the timing of exit among those who were drafted and among draft-induced 
volunteers. At the end of the conflict, the size of the military decreased dramatically. Some 7.4 
million veterans from this era are alive; these veterans make up a large proportion of today’s
veteran population. 
Figure 1 traces out the size of the U.S. (active component) military end strength, as well
as the population of young men (ages 19 to 22) and the ratio of the end strength to the young
men. This figure shows the overall population growth during the period, as well as the dramatic 
changes in the size of the end strength between periods of conflict and peaceful periods. The
ratio of end strength to young men was lowest during the period prior to WW II. Despite the 
relatively small population of the country during this period, the standing military was very small
(the end strength in 1930 was about 250,000 compared to about 12 million at the peak of WW II 
and roughly 1.3 million in recent years).5 During WW II, the end strength was substantially
larger than the population of young men (many who served were well outside the 19-22-year-old 
age range). During other periods included in Figure 1, the ratio of end strength to young men
generally was below 1. Immediately following WW II, the services drew down to the point that
5 The end strength in Figure 1 includes only those serving in the Active Components; the sizes of the Reserve
Components also have fluctuated substantially over time although these components generally were less central to
warfare efforts in the first half of the 20th century.
6
 
     
   
    
  
  
    
   
    
  
      
   
                                     
       
     






end strength dropped below two million. At this point, the population of young men was about
three times the size of the end strength. In many of the years encompassing the Korean and 
Vietnam wars, the end strength remained above two million; the size of the force increased
during each period of conflict and then returned to something closer to two million. The size of
the force fell around the advent of the AVF, and the general trend has been downward since 1980
while the overall size of the U.S. population has increased. Today, the ratio of end strength to 
young men is about 0.15, a ratio not seen since prior to WW II.6 























































Male population 19-22 Armed Forces Endstrength 
Endstrength/Male Pop 19-22 
NOTES: Authors’ tabulations based on Census data, Population Representation in the Military
Services, various years; Selected Manpower Statistics, various years; Census data, various years.
6 Given the increasing military role filled by women, the ratio of end strength to the total youth population may be
the more relevant metric. Today, that ratio is approximately 0.07. By these measures, the probability of serving in 





   
     
   
 





     
   
    
     
     
   
   
    
 
                                     
     
   
   
   
3. Data and Sample
To determine the long-run effects of veterans’ transitions into the labor force during weak
and strong labor markets, we require a dataset covering a long period of time to allow us to 
follow veterans for multiple decades while also including a wide variety of economic conditions. 
Fortunately, the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) provides very long-term information on a
sample of veterans who served during several different periods of time. About 20 percent of men 
ages 50 to 65 are veterans, and among men older than 50, veteran status is more common than 
college completion.7 Despite the recent conflicts, most veterans today are approaching or have 
passed retirement age; about one-third of male veterans are older than 70 and about three-
quarters are older than 50. Therefore, it is not surprising that veterans are well represented in the 
HRS, which has information on a total of 7,579 male veterans.
In this study, we focus on male veterans who served only for a short period of time (less 
than five years) and that left active service at a relative young age (not older than 25). We also 
focus on veterans who enlisted no later than 1972, i.e. before the elimination of the draft and 
establishment of an all-volunteer force (AVF). There are about 4,507 male veterans in the HRS
that fit our sampling criteria. Figure 2 shows the distribution of these veterans in the HRS by the 
year they exited active military service. It also shows the national unemployment rate that 
prevailed at the time they exited. Figure 2 shows that there is large variation in the
unemployment rate even among veterans leaving the military in the same era, and that our
sample includes veterans from several different eras.
7 Authors’ calculations from the American Community Survey 2014. This data source indicates roughly 6.3-million
male veterans ages 50 to 65 and nearly 15-million male veterans ages 50-plus in 2014, and these numbers accord 
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Year Ending Active Service Unemployment Rate 
# of veterans in HRS Unemployment rate
(%)
NOTES: Authors’ Calculations based on HRS files (1992-2012) and Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
Includes only veterans who served less than 5 years, enlisted in years up to 1972, and left active service at
age 25 or younger. The data also contains 10 veterans who left active service across before 1940 (from
1929 to 1939). We have omitted them for ease of plotting the figure.
In addition to the HRS Core Files — which contain information on veteran status, the
year enlisted in active service and the year exited military service — we also use the following
datasets: i) the RAND HRS Data File, which contains variables harmonized across waves
regarding employment status and several measures of household wealth; ii) the respondent cross-
year SSA summary earnings file, which provides information on earnings from Social Security





     
    
     
      
   
      
  
      
     
    
   
  
  
   
   
  
                                     
     
    
  
    
    
       
 
      
    
 
retirees, available for 1992, 1998, 2004, and 2010 ; and the pension wealth data files from 1992 
to 2010. 8 
Table A1 in the Appendix shows the sample descriptive statistics, based on all the
person-year observations available in the data. There are 29,753 person-year observations for the
veterans that fit our sample criteria.9 The average age in the sample is 67.8 years. The average 
age at enlistment was 19.6 years, and the average age at exit from military service was 22.1 
years. For the average observation in the sample, active service ended 46.1 years ago. This
highlights the potential of the HRS for studying the long-term effects of leaving military service 
in periods of a weak economy. The average prevailing unemployment rate at the time of exit 
from the military is 4.2 percent. The typical veteran in our sample is white (89.2 percent), with a 
high school degree or GED (89.1 percent), married (79.1 percent), and retired (55 percent).
Table 1A also provides descriptive statistics based on dividing the observations into three
roughly equal groups by unemployment rate at the time of exit from the military. Table 1A
indicates that veterans who left active service in periods of high unemployment are more likely
to have some college education and more likely to be separated or divorced than those who left 
active service in periods of low unemployment. Veterans who left active service in periods of
high unemployment are more likely to work full time, which may be partly or completely
explained by the fact that they are also on average younger. (Thus, we control for age in our
8 The RAND HRS Data file is an easy to use longitudinal data set based on the HRS data. It was developed at
RAND with funding from the National Institute on Aging and the Social Security Administration. The respondent
cross-year SSA summary earnings file is a restricted-access dataset, available upon application from HRS. It 
includes earnings from Social Security administrative records for the period 1951 through 2013, for those HRS
respondents who gave consent to access their Social Security information. The cross-year prospective Social
Security wealth measures file is a public access dataset contributed by Kapinos et al. (2016) and Kapinos and Fang 
(2016).
The pension welath data files is a public access dataset contributed by Gustman, Steinmeier, and Tabatabai (2014).











   
    
        
   
    
     
      
 
  
      
     
  
  
                                     
      
   
      
empirical analysis.) We do not see significant differences in terms of wealth for veterans who left 
active service in periods of low or high unemployment. But we see, counterintuitively, that
veterans who left active service in periods of high unemployment have slighter higher earnings. 
4. Addressing potential selection issues
Selection into the military across eras
Our analyses compare experiences of veterans who exited the military during relatively
prosperous times with the experiences of those who exited during less prosperous times. This
strategy would work if the selection into the military was somewhat consistent over the eras
included in our data. However, there are reasons to think that this may not be the case. For
example, Figure 1 suggests that during WW II a very large proportion of young men likely
served in the military. In fact, during WW II, military service was the norm, except among those
deemed ineligible to serve. Accordingly, Angrist and Krueger (1994) find that veterans from the 
WW II earn more than nonveterans due to a positive selection (in terms of their earnings
potential) into the military. In contrast in the eras following WW II through Vietnam, a smaller
and constant proportion of the population served in the military (although there was a sharp 
build-up at the beginning of each conflict and a drawdown at the end), and there is no evidence
of a positive or negative selection into the military in the literature. 10 This suggests that while
the population of WW II veterans may differ from those of later eras, the veterans of the Korean 
and Vietnam eras may be comparable on many measures. As noted above, these veterans should 
make up most of our sample.
10 Note that among Vietnam-era white men, military service was associated with large wage penalties upon entering 
the civilian labor market. By the 1990s, however, wages were quite similar between those who served in the military
and otherwise similar men who did not (see, in particular, Angrist (1990), as well as Angrist and Chen (2011)).
11
 
   
   
     
      
   
  
 
     
    
  
  





   
    
    
     
    
  
To address the issue of differential selectivity into the military across eras, we control for
sample selection, as in Heckman (1979), using two instruments to predict serving in the military.
The first instrument is the average yearly ratio of the military end strength to the 19- to 22-year-
old male population (Figure 1) during the years when a birth cohort was 19 to 22. We chose this
range because 19 years is the average age of enlistment and 22 is the average age of leaving the 
military in our sample. Also, a similar age range has been used in previous research to predict the
probability of enlistment (Card and Lemieux, 2001, De-Walque, 2007). As discussed in Section 
2, the endstrengh-to-young-male-population ratio is driven by the U.S. conflicts rather than by
individuals’ decisions, offering a way to correct for the potential endogeneity of veteran status.
The second instrument is the unemployment rate at age 19. Individuals may be more susceptible
to join the military in periods of high unemployment, especially if they are more likely to be
negatively affected by weak economic conditions. In this equation, we include both veterans and 
nonveterans from the HRS 1992-2012 waves.
Table 1 shows the estimation of the selection equation into military service (probit model, 
marginal effects reported). In addition of the two instruments discussed above, we also control
for race. We do not control for other characteristics (such as education, marital status, etc.) since
they are likely to be affected by the veteran status. We observe that both the Average End 
strength / Male 19-22 population ratio and the unemployment rate at age 19 are highly predictive 
of serving in the military. Using this equation, we predict for all veterans the Inverse Mills Ratio
𝜆𝜆(𝑋𝑋𝛽𝛽) = 𝜙𝜙(𝑋𝑋𝛽𝛽)⁄Φ(𝑋𝑋𝛽𝛽), where 𝑋𝑋𝛽𝛽 is the predicted Z-score, 𝜙𝜙(∙) denotes the normal density
function, and Φ(∙) denotes the normal distribution function.  We include 𝜆𝜆(𝑋𝑋𝛽𝛽) as an additional
control in all our regression models.
12
 
         
   
 
 
    
   
 










    
 
     
 
    
  
    
        
         
      
   




Average End strength / Male 19-22 population 0.398***
(0.012)
Unemployment rate at age 19 (in percentage points) 0.007***
(0.002)






Notes: Includes only one observation per male respondent in the HRS (after pooling waves 1992-
2012). Standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes p-value <0.01, ** denotes p-value<0.05, * 
denotes p-value<0.1
Timing the exit from military service and potential measurement error
Although former draftees/volunteers generally had few options to extend their service
after the ends of their contracts, it is still possible that some could time their exit in response to
weak civilian labor markets. To address this potential source of endogeneity, we instrument the
unemployment rate in the year of exit from active service with the average unemployment rate in
years two and three after enlistment. We choose this average because the two most common 
contract durations in the draft area were two and three years (see Section 2). In fact in our
sample, 35.6 percent of veterans have a calculated duration of service of two years and 26.7
percent have a calculated duration of three years (15.9 percent have a calculated duration of one
year or shorter, and 21.7 percent have a calculated duration of four years). It is worth noting that 
respondents report the year they enlisted and the year they left active service, so there is some 





   
     
   
 
      




     
  
    
    
 
 
    
   
   
                                     
     
    
  
As expected, the average unemployment rate in years two to three after enlistment is a 
strong instrument for the unemployment in the year of exit from active service. Table A2 in the
Appendix shows the first stage regression from the estimation of the effects on educational
attainment (see next section). Shea’s adjusted partial 𝑅𝑅2 (Shea, 1997) is a useful statistic in cases
with more than one endogenous regressor, as is the case for many regressions in this paper. Thus, 
instead of the F-statistic, we will discuss the Shea’s adjusted partial 𝑅𝑅2 , presenting in each table
the lowest Shea’s adjusted partial 𝑅𝑅2 across all endogenous regressors.11 In the case of Table A2,
the Shea’s adjusted partial 𝑅𝑅2 is large (0.4345), indicating that there is not a problem of weak 
instruments.12 
Besides controlling for potential timing in the decision to leave military service, the 
instrumental variable approach can also help overcome issues of measurement error. As
discussed above, the most common duration in contracts should be two and three years old. A
veteran reporting a duration of four years of service, for instance, might indicate that he extended 
his service, but could also indicate a misreport of the year leaving active service in the HRS
considering that veterans report this information many years after they left service. By using the
average unemployment rate of the two most expected contract durations as an instrument we are
also able to attenuate this source of measurement error in the data.
5. Effect on educational attainment and marital status
Our primary interest is the long-term effects of the unemployment rate at the time of
reintegration into the civilian economy on earnings, wealth, and retirement among veterans of
11 For completeness, we note that the F-statistic associated with this instrument is quite large (3408.77).
12 Shea’s adjusted partial 𝑅𝑅2 are calculated using the command estat firststage after the ivregress command in




   
   
    
    
    
    
     
   
 
     
      
   
   
  
  
   
   
     
   
    
   
   
the draft era. However, the literature suggests that individuals may respond to the lack of
opportunities in a weak labor market by acquiring more schooling. Table 1A in the Appendix
suggests that veterans who entered the civilian labor market in periods of high unemployment are
slightly more likely to complete at least some college. Therefore, we start by investigating the
effect on educational attainment of the unemployment rate at the time of exit from active service.
For each potential educational attainment category, we estimated the following linear
probability model, where the subscript 𝑖𝑖 indexes veterans:
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + βX𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 (1)
For each veteran, we used his first observation available in the HRS. The variable 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 is an
indicator variable that equals 1 if the veteran has the education level of interest, or equals 0 
otherwise. The variable 𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 is the prevailing unemployment rate at the time of leaving active
service. The vector 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 contains other controls including, race, age at exit from active service,
whether the respondent has a disability related to active service, and the Inverse Mills Ratio to 
control for selectivity into veteran status. The coefficients 𝛽𝛽𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 estimated (separately) for each
educational attainment category are shown in Table 2, using ordinary least squares (OLS) and 
two-stage least squares (2SLS)
Our estimations indicate that the veterans who left military service in periods of high 
unemployment were more likely than others to continue their education. We find positive and 
significant effects of the unemployment rate on the probabilities of having some college 
education and of having a college degree or higher education; and negative and significant
effects on the probability of not having a high school degree (or GED). The effects are not small.
For example, we find that a 1-percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate in the year the 
veteran entered civilian life increases the probability of having a college degree by 1.4 
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percentage points in the OLS model, and by 3.0 percentage points in the 2SLS model (roughly
20 percent compared to the mean). It is noteworthy that veterans during the eras covered in the 
HRS generally had access to education benefits upon leaving active duty. A similar behavioral 
response regarding college enrollment was found for individuals graduating from high school in 
period of high unemployment by Arkes (2003) and by Hershbein (2012). The larger estimates in
the 2SLS specification could reflect that some veterans may have had some opportunities to time
their exit from active service, but it might also reflect a correction for measurement error. We are 
not able to distinguish between these potential explanations in our analysis.
We also find that exiting the military in a period of high unemployment affects veteran’s
marital status in the long-run. We estimated OLS and 2SLS regressions similar to equation (1),
but for marital status (each category of marital status is the dependent variable in a separate 
regression). The estimated results are shown in Table 3. 
Table 2: Unemployment rate at exit from active service and educational attainment 
High School or College degree or Less than High School Some CollegeGED more
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Unemployment rate at
exit from active 
service -0.021*** -0.039*** -0.003 -0.005 0.010** 0.014* 0.014*** 0.030***
(in percentage points) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.240*** -0.205*** 0.147*** 0.151*** 0.140*** 0.133*** -0.047* -0.079***
(0.027) (0.029) (0.034) (0.036) (0.029) (0.031) (0.028) (0.030)
# Observations 4,444 4,444 4,444 4,444 4,444 4,444 4,444 4,444
# instrumented 
regressors 1 1 1 1
Shea's Adj. Partial 𝑹𝑹𝟐𝟐 0.4345 0.4345 0.4345 0.4345
Notes: Includes only one observation per respondent in the HRS (after pooling waves 1992-2012). The sample is limited to male veterans
who served less than five years, enlisted in years up to 1972, and left active service at age 25 or younger. Other controls include: race, age 
at exit from active service, and whether the respondent has a disability related to active service. Standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
p-value <0.01, ** denotes p-value<0.05, * denotes p-value<0.1
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Table 3: Unemployment rate at exit from active service and marital status
Married Separated or Divorced Widowed Never Married
Unemployment rate at











































# Observations 4,441 4,441 4,441 4,441 4,441 4,441 4,441 4,441
# instrumented 
regressors 1 1 1 1
Shea's Adj. Partial 𝑹𝑹𝟐𝟐 . 0.337 0.337 0.337 0.337
Notes: Includes only one observation per respondent in the HRS (after pooling waves 1992-2012). The sample is limited to male
veterans who served less than 5 years, enlisted in years up to 1972, and left active service at age 25 or younger. Other controls
include: race, age at exit from active service and whether the respondent has a disability related to active service. Standard errors in
parentheses. *** denotes p-value <0.01, ** denotes p-value<0.05, * denotes p-value<0.1
Our OLS estimations indicate that 1-percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate 
in the year of exit from active service is associated with a 2.7-percentage-point reduction in the
probability of being married, and a 1.7-percentage-point increase in the probability of being
divorced or separated. The effect sizes are quite similar in the 2SLS models. We do not find an 
effect on the probability of never being married. Thus, our findings suggest that veterans who 
entered the civilian labor market in periods of high unemployment suffer higher levels of family
instability. Previous investigations on the effect of entering the labor market during weak 
economic conditions have neglected to study its effect on marriage and family stability.13 
In the next sections, we investigate the effect of reentering civilian life in years of high
unemployment on earnings, wealth and retirement decisions. In these analyses, we do not control
13 However, our findings are supported by a related literature that links the decline in the prevalence of marriage 
among young adults to reduced labor-market opportunities faced by males, which make them less valuable as
marital partners (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2017).
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for educational attainment or marital status because they are also affected by the notional
experiment at hand. Moreover, they are important determinants of earnings, wealth, and 
retirement decisions. Thus, controlling for education and marital status would bias our estimates
of the average total effect of reentering the civilian life in periods of high unemployment.14 
6. Effect on employment and earnings
We estimate the short-term and long-term effects of reentering the civilian labor market
in periods of high unemployment using information from the respondent cross-year SSA
summary earnings file, in combination with the RAND HRS datafiles. Figure 3 shows the
average earnings in 2016 dollars of the veterans in our sample after they left active service. We 
observe that average earnings tend to decline, mainly due to reduction in the probability of
receiving income, roughly 30 years after leaving active service — the average veteran in our
sample would be 52 years old at that point. Our regression analysis takes into account this shape
of the earnings profile by accommodating a flexible form in the estimation of the short- and 
long-run effects on employment and earnings of the unemployment rate at the time of exit from 
active service.
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0 10 20 30 40 50 
Years after exiting active service 
Source: RAND HRS files and Respondent Cross-Year SSA Summary Earnings File.
Note: The sample is limited to male veterans who served less than five years, enlisted in years up
to 1972, and left active service at age 25 or younger.
First, we estimate the linear probability model shown in equation (2) below. The
outcome 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an indicator variable measuring whether veteran 𝑖𝑖 is working in year 𝑡𝑡. We use 
two definitions for 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 : i) whether the veteran earns income in every quarter in year 𝑡𝑡; and ii)
whether the veteran earns no income (in any quarter) in year 𝑡𝑡.
(2)
On the right-hand side of equation (2), 𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 is the unemployment rate at the time of exit 
from active service and 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are a set of indicator variables for the number of years passed 
since leaving active service. We only include in the regression the years after the veteran left the
military (up to 50 years). We have grouped the time passed in periods of five years. The 
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coefficients of interest are 𝛽𝛽𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝑘𝑘 . Additional controls in 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 include race, age at exit from active 
service, whether the respondent has a disability related to active service, and the Inverse Mills
Ratio to control for selectivity into veteran status. We also control for year fixed effects (𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖) in
the regression. All standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
The estimation results for 𝛽𝛽𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝑘𝑘 are shown in Table 4. In the 2SLS model we instrument
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 with 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅����𝚤𝚤 �����𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝚤𝚤 is the average unemployment rate two to three�, where  
years after enlistment. There are in total 10 instrumented variables.15 We find that higher
unemployment rates are associated with a lower initial probability of reporting income in all 
quarters, although the effects are not statistically significant. Interestingly, these negative effects
reverse in the long-run, and even turn positive and significant 40 years after leaving active
service (i.e., when the average veteran is 62 years old). For example, the 2SLS model indicates
that 1-percentage-point higher unemployment rate at the time of exit from active service 
increases the probability of reporting income in all quarters by 4.1 percentage points 41 to 45 
years after leaving active service. This suggests that veterans leaving service in periods of weak
labor markets are likely to retire later. We return to this issue later.
Table 4 also indicates that veterans leaving active service in periods of high
unemployment are more likely to not report income in any quarter in the first years after exit 
from service (these estimates generally do not achieve statistical significance), but this effect
again is reversed in the latter years, in line with the previous finding. 
15 The lowest Shea’s partial 𝑅𝑅2 is still relatively large, indicating that there is not a problem of weak instruments.
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Table 4: Unemployment rate at exit from active service and employment
Income in all quarters No Income in any quarter
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Average effect of unemp.t 
rate at exit from active 
service:
1-5 years after exit -0.002 -0.003 0.003 -0.004
(0.006) (0.011) (0.004) (0.008)
6-10 years after exit -0.003 -0.011 0.002 0.004
(0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.007)
11-15 years after exit -0.014*** -0.022** 0.007* 0.009
(0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007)
16-20 years after exit -0.009* -0.012 0.008* 0.009
(0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007)
21-25 years after exit -0.005 -0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008)
26-30 years after exit -0.003 -0.004 0.003 0.004
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008)
31-35 years after exit -0.002 -0.004 0.001 0.004
(0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009)
36-40 years after exit 0.005 0.015 -0.004 -0.014
(0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010)
41-45 years after exit 0.015** 0.041*** -0.015** -0.041***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.011)
46-50 years after exit 0.020*** 0.031*** -0.017** -0.028**
(0.007) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012)
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.013 0.012 0.001 0.001
(0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023)
Observations 146,951 146,951 146,951 146,951
# instrumented regressors 10 10
Lowest Shea's Adj. Partial
𝑹𝑹𝟐𝟐 . 0.334 0.334
Notes: Includes only one observation per respondent in the HRS (after pooling waves 1992-2012). The
sample is limited to male veterans who served less than five years, enlisted in years up to 1972, and left
active service at age 25 or younger. Other controls include: indicator variables for the number of years
passed since leaving active service, race, age at exit from active service, whether the respondent has a 
disability related to active service, and year fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at
the individual level. *** denotes p-value <0.01, ** denotes p-value<0.05, * denotes p-value<0.1
21
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Now we turn to estimating the effects on earnings. We estimate an equation similar to
equation (2), but the left-hand side variable 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is now a transformation of the earnings in each
year. In particular, we use the hyperbolic sine transformatio , where 
is the 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the total earnings in year 𝑡𝑡. This transformation has several advantages. First, the 
function can take arguments that have negative, zero, and positive values. Thus, we can use the
function not only with variables like earnings that can take the value of zero, but also with 
variables like net worth (as in Section 7) that can take negative values. Second, the hyperbolic
sine transformation is symmetric around zero (see Figure A1 in the appendix). For example, the 
transformation applied to 1 gives 0.383 and applied to -1 gives -0.383. This implies that, except
for very low values in the argument, the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation can be
approximated by log(2𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) or  log(2) + log(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) if the argument is positive; or by 
− log(2(−𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )) or  −log(2) −log(−𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) if the argument is negative. In both cases, the results
can be interpreted the same way as using a standard logarithmic dependent variable. For
example, using the OLS results in column 1 of Table 5, we find that 1-percentage-point increase 
in the unemployment rate at the time of exiting active service implies earnings that are, on 
average, 6.2 percent lower during the first five years, although the effect is not statistically
significant. We found similar results (and nonsignificance) in the 2SLS model in column 2. 
Although most of the estimates in columns 1 and 2 in Table 5 for the first years after 
leaving active service are negative and nonsignificant, we see an overall trend of recovery.
Figure 4 plots the estimates from the 2SLS model in column 2. Another interesting result is that 
we find positive effects on earnings about 40 years after exiting active service. This is explained, 




    
   
  
   
      
     
  
      
       
    




In columns 3 and 4 of Table 5, we investigate how the unemployment rate at the time of
leaving active service impacted earnings conditional on employment (i.e. the amount earned, 
conditional on reporting any earnings). To do this we selected only observations where earnings
were reported for all quarters in the year. We find that a 1 percentage point increase in the 
unemployment rate at the time of leaving active service reduces earnings by 2.4 percent on 
average during the first five-year period using the OLS model and by 5.8 percent using the 2SLS
model. The negative initial impact disappears with time, and it is not significant 15 years after
leaving active service (the estimates from the 2SLS model are plotted in Figure 5). Columns 3 
and 4 of Table 5 also show positive impacts on earnings 40 years after leaving the military, but
the effects are not statistically significant. This suggests that an important factor behind the
positive and significant effects found in columns 1 and 2 is the extensive margin, i.e., the 
probability of reporting income. We return later to the analysis of the effect of the unemployment
rate at the moment of leaving active service on working and retiring in old age.
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Table 5: Unemployment rate at exit from active service and earnings
With earnings in all All observations quarters
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Average effect of unemp.t rate at exit from active service:
1-5 years after exit -0.062 -0.046 -0.024*** -0.058***
(0.050) (0.092) (0.007) (0.011)
6-10 years after exit -0.067 -0.151* -0.014** -0.044***
(0.047) (0.086) (0.006) (0.010)
11-15 years after exit -0.091* -0.111 -0.013** -0.028***
(0.046) (0.083) (0.006) (0.010)
16-20 years after exit -0.093* -0.083 -0.007 -0.006
(0.048) (0.083) (0.006) (0.011)
21-25 years after exit -0.063 -0.044 -0.005 -0.003
(0.051) (0.088) (0.007) (0.012)
26-30 years after exit -0.027 -0.022 0.001 0.008
(0.053) (0.091) (0.008) (0.013)
31-35 years after exit -0.017 -0.033 -0.009 0.003
(0.059) (0.101) (0.009) (0.015)
36-40 years after exit 0.057 0.199* -0.000 0.018
(0.068) (0.112) (0.011) (0.018)
41-45 years after exit 0.189** 0.501*** 0.004 0.045*
(0.076) (0.122) (0.017) (0.025)
46-50 years after exit 0.196** 0.338*** 0.037* 0.066*
(0.081) (0.131) (0.022) (0.036)
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.068 0.057 0.040 0.032
(0.268) (0.268) (0.032) (0.032)
Observations 146,581 146,581 146,581 146,581
# instrumented regressors 10 10
Lowest Shea's Adj. Partial
𝑹𝑹𝟐𝟐 . 0.335 0.335
Notes: Includes only one observation per respondent in the HRS (after pooling waves 1992-
2012). The sample is limited to male veterans who served less than five years, enlisted in years
up to 1972, and left active service at age 25 or younger. Other controls include: indicator
variables for the number of years passed since leaving active service, race, age at exit from
active service, whether the respondent has a disability related to active service and year fixed
effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the individual level. *** denotes p-




    
  
 
     
 
 
Figure 4: Effect of unemployment rate at exit from active aervice












1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 
Years after exiting active service 
Note: 10 endogenous regressors. Lowest Shea's Adjusted Partial R-squared: 0.3351 
Figure 5: Effect of enemployment rate at exit from active service on earnings

















1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 
Years after exiting active service 
Note: 10 endogenous regressors. Lowest Shea's Adjusted Partial R-squared: 0.3618 
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7. Effect on prospective retirement wealth
In the previous section, we found some evidence that the unemployment rate at the time
of exit from the military had negative effects on earnings in the civilian labor market, especially
after conditioning on receiving earnings (in all quarters) in a year. Since these effects lasted for
more than a decade, we also investigate how the unemployment rate at the time of exit from the 
military influenced accumulated wealth and financial preparedness for retirement. Figure 6
shows the mean and median wealth of veterans in our sample, between the ages of 60 and 62, 
broken out by wealth component. It excludes spouses’ prospective Social Security wealth and
wealth from spouses’ employer-sponsored pension plans. Our analysis focuses on the largest
components of the prospective retirement wealth: Social Security, employer pensions, housing




 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = log�𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 
 
     
 
    
 
     
 
     
  
    
  
    
 











































Other Real State 
Businesses 
Secondary Resiency 
Average Wealth:  $855,439
Figure 6: Prospective retirement wealth of male draft-era veterans in the HRS (2016 $)
Source: RAND HRS Data File, Kapinos et al. (2016), Kapinos and Fang (2016) and Gustman,
Steinmeier and Tabatabai (2014). 
Note: The sample is limited to male veterans who served less than five years, enlisted in years up
to 1972, and left active service at age 25 or younger, and who are between 60 and 62 years old in
the HRS. The calculations exclude spouses’ prospective Social Security wealth and wealth from
spouses’ employer-sponsored pension plans.
We estimate the linear regression models depicted in equation (3), where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the
hyperbolic sine transformation of the wealth variable (𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) of interest, i.e., 𝑌𝑌
. The variable 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 measures the number of years since the veteran left the military.
The vector 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 includes additional controls (race, age at exit from active service, whether the 
respondent has a disability related to active service, and the Inverse Mills Ratio to control for
selectivity into veteran status). As before, we also control for year fixed effects (𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖) in the
regression and standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Since we want to measure 
preretirement wealth, we only include veterans younger than 62 in our estimation sample. 
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The model in equation (3) is similar to the one in equation (2), but given that we have
fewer observations in the case of wealth measures than in the case of earnings, we estimate only
linear effects of the time passed since re-entering the civilian life, rather than several discrete 
time-varying effects as in equation (2).16 However, wealth variables do not exhibit an inverted
U-shape as in the case of earnings. Figure 7 shows that wealth variables have a linear trend, at
least for the range of years after active service that are observed in the HRS. Thus, specifying
linear effects of time (and its interaction with the unemployment rate at exit from the military)
instead of a more flexible form should not be a cause for concern.
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2(𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 35) + 𝛽𝛽3[(𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 35) × 𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖] + 𝛽𝛽4𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (3)
To simplify the interpretation of the coefficients in equation (3), we centered the years
passed since leaving active service at 35, which is the mean in the sample.17 In this way the we
can interpret the coefficient 𝛽𝛽1 as the average effect (measured in percentage change) of one
additional percentage point in the unemployment rate at the time of leaving the military on the 
veterans’ wealth 35 years later, which corresponds in our sample to an average age of 57.
Coefficient 𝛽𝛽3 measures how that effect changes with one additional year. As before, we also
estimate 2SLS models, in which we instrument 𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 and (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 35) × 𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 with 𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝚤𝚤����� and 
(𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 35) × 𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝚤𝚤�����, (average unemployment rate in years two to three after enlistment). The 
estimation results of coefficients 𝛽𝛽1 and 𝛽𝛽3 are shown in Table 6 and Table 7. The 2SLS model
16 Since the HRS surveys individuals 50 and older, we have fewer observations regarding wealth measures per
individual than in the case of earnings, which uses historical data from Social Security administrative records.
17 Recall that we are only including veterans younger than 62, so the average time passed since leaving the military
is shorter than for the full sample shown in Table A1.
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delivers larger estimates suggesting a potential combination of veterans with better earnings
capacity being able to time their exit from the military and also measurement error issues.18 









28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 
Years after exiting active service
Prospective SS wealth Pension Wealth 
Net Worth of  Primary Residency 
We find that veterans who entered the labor market during times of higher unemployment 
have lower prospective Social Security wealth (Table 6). This finding correlates with our
previous results on negative effects in earnings. A 1-percentage-point increase in the
unemployment rate reduces the prospective Social Security wealth 35 five years after leaving
active service by 7.4 percent in the 2SLS model.  
We also find a positive estimate for 𝛽𝛽3, indicating that the negative effect diminishes with
time. Using the results from the 2SLS model, we plot in Figure 8 the evolution of the marginal 
effects of a 1-point increase in the unemployment rate at the time of leaving the military on the
prospective Social Security wealth. We observe how the estimated negative effects get smaller




    
  
 








     
            
      
     
     
    
     
     
     
    
     
         
           
 
   
  
  
   
    
     
   
  
with time and become not statistically significant 40 years after leaving the military. Table 6 also
shows, interestingly, that we do not obtain any statistically significant effect of the
unemployment rate on wealth from employer-sponsored pension plans. 
Table 6: Unemployment rate at exit from active service, prospective Social Security wealth
and employer pension wealth























(Unemp. Rate) X 


















Observations 3,718 3,718 5,610 5,610
# instrumented regressors 2 2
Lowest Shea's Adj. Partial 𝑹𝑹𝟐𝟐 . 0.3293 0.3031
Notes: Includes only one observation per respondent in the HRS (after pooling waves 1992-2012). The sample is
limited to male veterans who served less than 5 years, enlisted in years up to 1972, and left active service at age 
25 or younger. Other controls include: race, age at exit from active service, whether the respondent has a 
disability related to active service and year fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the 
individual level. *** denotes p-value <0.01, ** denotes p-value<0.05, * denotes p-value<0.1
Table 7 suggests that a higher unemployment rate at the time of separation from the
military could lead to a significantly smaller household total net worth (excluding prospective
Social Security wealth, employer-sponsored retirement wealth, and other retirement accounts),




   
   
    
   








indicate that a 1-percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate at the time of exit is
associated with a 22.3 percent reduction in the household total net worth 35 years after exit from
active service, and this effect is reduced slowly with time. Note, however, that these effects are 
estimated imprecisely and are not statistically significant. The 2SLS model produces similar
effects of the unemployment rate on the two major components of the total net worth: the net
financial wealth (i.e., savings and investments) and the net value of the primary residency.


















25 30 35 40 45 
Years after exiting active service 
Taken together, our findings indicate that higher unemployment rates at the time of exit 
from the military can negatively affect veterans’ wealth in old age and their financial
preparedness for retirement. In particular, we find negative effects on Social Security wealth




   
    
    
   
    





   




       
                  
        
       
       
      
       
       
       
      
       
              
                
 
   
  
   
 
of the main sources of wealth in retirement (Figure 6). However, we also find that veterans might
eventually catch up with their peers who entered the civilian labor market in better economic 
conditions. The strong negative effects that we estimate on other measures of wealth are 
uniformly negative, but they are not statistically significant. In the next subsection, we
investigate whether this suggestive evidence of the negative effects on preretirement wealth
correlates with effects regarding working in old age and retirement.
Table 7: Unemployment rate at exit from active service and net total worth
(excludes prospective Social Security wealth, employer-sponsored retirement wealth
and other retirement accounts)
Net Total Worth
Main components of Total Net Worth:
PrimaryNet Financial Residency NetWealth Worth



























(Unemp. Rate) X 


























Observations 7,454 7,454 8,401 8,401 8,401 8,401
# instrumented regressors 2 2 2
Lowest Shea's Adj. Partial 𝑹𝑹𝟐𝟐 . 0.3533 0.3482 0.3482
Notes: Includes only one observation per respondent in the HRS (after pooling waves 1992-2012). The sample is limited to
male veterans who served less than five years, enlisted in years up to 1972, and left active service at age 25 or younger.
Other controls include: race, age at exit from active service, whether the respondent has a disability related to active service,
and year fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the individual level. *** denotes p-value <0.01, **
denotes p-value<0.05, * denotes p-value<0.1
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8. Effect on working in old age and retirement
We find that veterans who reentered the civilian life in periods of high unemployment
seem eventually to catch up in terms of earnings and wealth with their peers. The evidence 
presented in Section 6, that higher unemployment rates at the time of leaving the military are
associated with higher probability of having positive earnings 40 years later, suggests that
extending their working lives may be one way in which veterans compensate for entering the 
labor market under less-than-ideal circumstances. In this section, we revisit this finding using
information from veterans’ reported labor force status instead of records from Social Security
and controlling from age instead of time passed since leaving the military. We also investigate 
how the unemployment rate when exiting active service affects veterans’ decisions to claim 
Social Security benefits.
We estimate the model in equation (4), which is similar to that in equation (2), but in 
this case we use a set of indicator variables 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎,𝑖𝑖 that take the value of 1 if the veteran is in age
category 𝑎𝑎, and take the value of zero otherwise. We use the following age categories in our
analysis: 50 to 61 years, 62 to less than normal retirement age (NRA); NRA to 69; 70 to 74; 75
to 79; and 80 and older.19 All other variables on the right-hand side are defined as before, and
standard errors are clustered at the individual level. In the 2SLS models, we instrument 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 
𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 with 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝚤𝚤����� ����� is the average unemployment rate two to three years after , where 𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝚤𝚤 
enlistment.
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑𝑘𝑘=1 6 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇,𝑘𝑘𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∑𝑘𝑘=1 6 𝛽𝛽𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝑘𝑘�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖� + 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (4)




    
   
     
     
   




     
   
  
    
     





   
  
     
    
In our first analysis, the dependent variable 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the
veteran reports working full or part-time or looking for a job, and equals 0 otherwise. The
estimation results for the coefficients 𝛽𝛽𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝑘𝑘 are shown in Table 8. We find that veterans who left
military service in periods of high unemployment are more likely to work or search for work in 
old age. The largest effect is in the 62 to NRA range: a 1-percentage-point increase in the
unemployment rate at the time of leaving active service increases the probability of working or
looking for work in this age range by 3.7 percentage points in the OLS model, and by 4.7 
percentage points in the 2SLS model. The estimated effects remain positive but are smaller at
higher ages. 
In our second analysis, we estimate the same linear model in equation (4), but the 
dependent variable 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the veteran has already claimed
Social Security, and equals zero otherwise. We keep in the analysis sample all observations until
the veteran first receives social security, and exclude all later observations. Thus, we are 
estimating a discrete hazard rate of claiming Social Security conditional on not having claimed
before. The estimation results for the coefficients 𝛽𝛽𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝑘𝑘 are also shown in Table 8. The OLS
models suggest that veterans who reentered the civilian labor market in periods of high 
unemployment are less likely to claim Social Security early, between the age of 62 and the NRA.
In contrast, they are more likely to claim after the NRA in comparison to their peers, conditional
on not having claimed earlier. As it would be expected, the effect on the hazard rate decreases
with age (after reaching NRA) and eventually becomes small and non-significant. The 2SLS
estimates follow the same pattern: negative effects on the hazard rate prior to reaching NRA,
positive effects after reaching NRA, and eventually small effects. However, the effects are not
statistically significant in the 2SLS model except for the 70 to 74 age category. 
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Table 8: Unemployment rate at exit from active service, work in old age and claiming 
of Social Security benefits.





VARIABLES OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
50-61







































































Notes: Includes only one observation per respondent in the HRS (after pooling waves
1992-2012). The sample is limited to male veterans who served less than five years,
enlisted in years up to 1972, and left active service at age 25 or younger. Other controls
include: indicator variables for age range, race, age at exit from active service, whether the
respondent has a disability related to active service, and year fixed effects. Standard errors
(in parentheses) are clustered at the individual level. *** denotes p-value <0.01, ** denotes
p-value<0.05, * denotes p-value<0.1
Taken together, the results from Table 8 indicate that veterans who left military service in
periods of high unemployment are less likely to retire early and more likely to work past their
NRA than veterans who exited the military in better economic times. This suggests that although
differences in earnings disappear with time, the accumulated negative effects on wealth and
financial preparedness for retirement may be large enough that veterans compensate for it by
extending their working life.
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9. Conclusion 
In this study, we investigate the short- and long-term effects on leaving military service 
in periods of high unemployment. Our sample includes male veterans from the draft era who 
served for ess than five years and who left active service at 25 or younger. We find that entering
the civilian labor market during a period of relatively high unemployment has negative and long-
term effects. We find statistically significant, negative, and substantive effects on earnings
conditional on receipt for more than a decade. We also find evidence of negative effects on
prospective Social Security wealth, although these effects appear to disappear in time, and larger,
but not statistically significant, effects on other sources of wealth (savings, investments, and 
housing). We also find evidence that veterans may try to compensate for these negative effects
by delaying retirement and working longer. It is worth noting that these findings hold regardless
of the fact that veterans who enter the labor market in weak conditions obtain more post-
secondary education than other veterans. Finally, we find that veterans who enter the civilian
labor market in periods of high unemployment have higher levels of family instability (i.e., they 
are more likely to get separated or divorced), which may be another indication of underlying
negative effects on the household economic well-being.
Our results add to the evidence that the negative impacts of entering the labor market
during an economic downturn are both substantive and very long-lasting. While providing
opportunities for additional post-secondary education or training (as the military does) are likely
to be helpful to young workers who, by timing of birth, enter the labor market during economic
downturns, our results suggest that such programs may not make up for the total impact. Indeed, 





   
 
  





affect even the decision of when to retire: This suggests the effects occur over a longer time 
period than what has been addressed in other studies. 
Our findings suggest that many of today’s younger workers, who entered the labor
market during the Great Recession, may respond by extending their working life in order to 
compensate for the negative starting conditions. Thus, our findings should be of interest to Social
Security and to policy analysts forecasting retirement patterns of young workers. Our finding
should also be of interest to policymakers working to help smooth current, active-military
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Table A1: Sample statistics
All 
sample
By unemployment rate at exit
from active service
Less From More 
than 3.9% than 
3.9% to 5.0% 5.0%
Current age 67.8 70.4 69.5 63.7
Age at enlistment 19.6 19.6 19.5 19.8
Age at exit from active service 22.1 22.0 22.1 22.3
Years since exited from active service 46.1 48.9 47.8 41.9
Race
Unemployment rate in enlistment
year (%)














Black 8.7% 7.9% 10.2% 8.1%













Unknown 60.2% 40.5% 58.5% 80.2%
Education Less than high school 17.6% 22.0% 18.3% 13.0%
High school or GED 38.1% 37.2% 36.7% 40.1%












Separated or divorced 9.5% 6.8% 8.1% 13.3%
Widowed 8.3% 10.4% 9.3% 5.5%
Never married 2.3% 2.0% 2.4% 2.5%
Unknown 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.2%
Note:Means from all person-year observations in the sample, unless otherwise noted.
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By unemployment rate at
exit
from active service
Less From More 
than 3.9% than 
3.9% to 5.0% 5.0%
19.3% 23.2% 39.0%
2.2% 2.6% 3.1%
Unemployed 1.5% 1.1% 1.1% 2.1%
Partly retired 11.1% 9.7% 11.7% 12.0%
Retired 55.0% 66.1% 59.5% 40.6%
Disabled 1.8% 1.2% 1.5% 2.4%







Veteran’s Social Security prospective wealth
Household Social Security prospective 
wealth
Net financial wealth

















IRA 57,691 57,930 55,261 58,731





1 year after exit













10 years after exit 33,652 31,950 31,576 37,406
15 years after exit 38,388 36,767 35,004 43,253
20 years after exit 41,834 38,929 41,793 44,834
25 years after exit 43,994 43,705 41,023 47,074
30 years after exit 44,065 44,197 43,507 44,475
35 years after exit 40,368 41,628 39,554 39,676
40 years after exit 27,472 27,314 28,015 27,068
Note: Means from all person-year observations in the sample, unless otherwise noted.
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Table A2: First stage regression for instrumenting unemployment rate 
at time of exit from active service
Outcome: 
Unemployment rate in year
of exit from active service
Average unemployment rate in years 2-3 after
enlistment 0.789***
(in percentage points) (0.014)

















Notes: Includes only one observation per respondent in the HRS (after pooling waves 1992-
2012). The sample is limited to male veterans who served less than 5 years, enlisted in years up to
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